Researcher: Ev Fedorenko

A different reality

by Jennifer Michalowski |

This story also appears in our Spring 2026 BrainScan newsletter.

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Schizophrenia, a complex and variable psychiatric disorder, changes people’s perceptions of reality. People with schizophrenia may hear, see, or sense things that aren’t there, and they often hold firm to mistaken ideas about the world despite strong evidence to the contrary. As if these changes aren’t disruptive enough, they are usually accompanied by cognitive difficulties and disorganized thinking.

Scientists at the McGovern Institute’s Poitras Center for Psychiatric Disorders Research are looking for clues into the origins of the disorder and its symptoms so they can help guide the development of new treatments. Encouragingly, they are beginning to uncover the brain changes that reshape reality for people with schizophrenia.

Genetic clues

Researchers who want to study the root causes of a disease often turn to genetics for clues—and the genetics of schizophrenia are complicated. Hundreds of different genes seem to shape people’s risk of developing the disorder, most of which nudge risk only slightly. For most people, it seems to be the cumulative effect of these genes and how they intersect with other risk factors, like stress and prenatal complications, that determine who develops schizophrenia and who does not.

Gene variants that substantially impact the risk of schizophrenia are expected to reveal more about the underlying biology of the disorder than genes whose individual impact is minor. But these variants are rare, and it took a massive study to find them. In 2022, scientists at the Broad Institute’s Stanley Center for Psychiatric Research reported that after analyzing the DNA of more than 24,000 people with schizophrenia, they had identified mutations in 10 genes that dramatically increased the risk of the disorder.

“I think this is exciting, because for the first time, you can actually have an animal model based onhuman genetics findings,” says McGovern Institute and Stanley Center Investigator Guoping Feng. “You can put these mutations in animal models to try to understand how this mutation affects brain development, circuit formation, circuit function, and behavior.” Feng is also the James W. (1963) and Patricia T. Poitras Professor of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT.

Woman and man sit at desk looking at brain image on computer screen.
Guoping Feng (right) and his postdoctoral researcher Tinting Zhou (left) examine a mouse brain carrying a genetic mutation associated with schizophrenia. Photo: Steph Stevens

In work supported by the Poitras Center, the Stelling Family Research Fund, and the Yang Tan Collective at MIT, Feng’s lab has engineered three strains of mice that carry ultra-rare schizophrenia-associated mutations. Their first significant findings come from mice with a mutation in a gene called Grin2a. People who inherit a dysfunctional Grin2a gene, which neurons need to detect and respond to a signaling molecule called NMDA, are 20 times more likely to develop schizophrenia than people in whom Grin2a is intact.

Tingting Zhou, a postdoctoral researcher in Feng’s lab, says the team had to think carefully about how to assess mice for schizophrenia-like symptoms. You can’t ask mice about hallucinations or delusions. Instead, Zhou designed an experiment that tested how well mice use new information to update their beliefs about the world—a process that is thought to be impaired in people who experience delusions.

To illustrate how failure to update beliefs can skew someone’s ideas about reality, Zhou describes a situation in which a person watches a stranger reach for something in their pocket, fearing that person intends to harm them. Then, the stranger’s hand emerges with a lollipop. The new information should alleviate concern—but a person with schizophrenia might hold on to their original belief, convinced the lollipop-holding stranger is a threat.

In Zhou’s experiments testing animals’ belief-updating abilities, mice had to keep up with changing information to earn as many treats as possible. Those with the Grin2a mutation were slow to adapt when experimenters adjusted the relative values of their choices. “Once the animal learns something, it’s very hard for them to update the information,” Zhou explains.

Zhou and Feng linked this behavioral difference to abnormally low activity in a part of the brain called the mediodorsal thalamus. The mediodorsal thalamus acts like a switchboard in the brain, routing and coordinating information between different parts of the cortex to support thinking, decision-making, and flexible behavior. Studies with patients have implicated this region in schizophrenia as well, showing that it has fewer cells and is less active in people with the disorder than those without.

A slice of mouse brain dyed purple showing two pink blobs towards the center.
The mediodorsal thalamus (pink) is less active in people with schizophrenia and mouse models of the disease. Image: Guoping Feng, Tingting Zhou

Feng’s lab and others are now looking for belief-updating deficits in other genetic models of schizophrenia. “The goal is to look at whether this is a converging mechanism…then you can start to look at what other [brain] regions are involved,” he says.

In mice with Grin2a mutations, the researchers were able to restore normal belief updating by activating neurons in the mediodorsal thalamus, offering hope that manipulating the same circuitry might benefit patients. “It will not be easy,” Feng says, “but at least you have something you can work on. Previously, it was just very hard to imagine how to develop a new therapeutic for schizophrenia.”

Internal noise

It’s not just the genes associated with schizophrenia that differ across affected individuals. The symptoms of the disorder vary, too. People experience some combination of delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, and cognitive problems—but none of these are experienced by everyone with the disorder. This heterogeneity complicates the diagnosis, treatment, and study of schizophrenia. For this reason, some researchers are focusing their efforts on understanding its individual symptoms.

Evelina Fedorenko, a McGovern Investigator and associate professor of brain and cognitive sciences, specializes in understanding how the brain processes speech and language. But recently, her group has teamed up with physician-researcher Ann Shinn at McLean Hospital to begin exploring why some people hear voices when no one is speaking.

About three out of four people with schizophrenia experience auditory hallucinations, which most commonly involve voices.

These hallucinations can be distressing, sometimes involving threatening language or commands to cause harm. Some people with mood disorders or post-traumatic stress disorder also hear them.

Scientist portrait
Tamar Regev was the 2022–2024 Poitras Center Postdoctoral
Fellow in Evelina Fedorenko’s lab. Photo: Steph Stevens

To investigate, Tamar Regev, a research scientist in the Fedorenko lab, asked people who experience auditory hallucinations to listen to different kinds of sounds inside an MRI scanner, then compared how their brains responded versus the brains of people without auditory hallucinations. Her study included participants with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, both with and without a history of auditory hallucinations, as well as healthy controls.

Inside the scanner, participants listened to three kinds of audio: spoken language, gibberish, and gibberish so scrambled that it barely resembled speech. Regev analyzed how these sounds impacted activity in areas the brain uses to process auditory input at different levels: a part of the auditory cortex that is sensitive to all sounds; a higher-level region within the auditory cortex that usually responds to anything that sounds like speech, even if its content is unclear; and the brain’s language-processing network, which is called on to understand the content of speech, as well as written or signed communications.

Regev found that in people with hallucinations, the part of the brain that usually responds only to language responded to meaningless speech as well. “In this pathway from auditory to speech to language processing, the stimuli that should be filtered out somewhere on the way are now passing to higher stations,” she explains. While auditory hallucinations don’t require external sounds, Fedorenko and Regev propose that the brain’s language areas might be similarly activated by “internal noise” in auditory circuits.

Scrambled language

In people who experience auditory hallucinations, the brain’s language regions respond to sounds that aren’t language–including scrambled meaningless gibberish. Below is a sample gibberish clip used in Fedorenko’s study.

Early identification

McGovern scientists have also used brain imaging to investigate what happens in the brain before people develop clear symptoms of schizophrenia. The disorder is usually diagnosed in adolescence or young adulthood, when patients exhibit the first signs of psychosis—but its origins in the brain likely take root years before that.

“One of the things we’re super interested in is, can you identify people at risk early on, before they have a big problem,” says McGovern Investigator John Gabrieli, whose work is also supported by the Poitras Center and the Stelling Family Research Fund. That might give clinicians an opportunity to intervene and lessen or prevent the disorder’s most devastating effects, he says.

Gabrieli and his colleagues have studied the brains of children who, because they have a parent or sibling with schizophrenia, have an elevated risk of developing the disorder themselves. They found that a system called the default mode network (DMN), which is overactive in adults with schizophrenia, is already working overtime when children in this high-risk group are seven- to 12-years-old.

Gabrieli explains that the DMN is active when people are not actively engaged in an activity or thinking about the external world. “It turns on when you think about your family, your values, your hopes for the future, or important events of your life. It’s almost like a system of who /you are,” he says. Hallucinations and delusions experienced by people with schizophrenia may be associated with overactivity in this network.

MRI images of two brains, one showing an active DMN and the other showing a healthy DMN.
The default mode network (DMN) is a large-scale brain network that is active when a person is not focused on the outside world and the brain is at wakeful rest. The DMN is often over-engaged in adolescents with depression and anxiety, as well as teens at risk for these and other disorders like schizophrenia (left). DMN activation and connectivity can be “tuned” to a healthier state through the practice of mindfulness (right).

“They’re kind of living in their internal world of beliefs, as opposed to the reality that most of us occupy,” Gabrieli explains.

He and his colleagues think overactivity in the DMN might make people vulnerable to schizophrenia—and their data show this atypical activity can be detected many years before the core symptoms of schizophrenia appear. With further validation, children with hyperactivity of the DMN might be candidates for early intervention.

With new and better interventions, the ability to identify people who may be on a path toward schizophrenia will be even more impactful—underscoring the need for continued research on multiple fronts. A recent gift of $8 million to the Poitras Center from Patricia and James Poitras is helping accelerate this work in labs at the McGovern Institute and beyond.

Language processing beyond the neocortex

by Jennifer Michalowski |

The ability to use language to communicate is one of things that makes us human. At MIT’s McGovern Institute, scientists led by Evelina Fedorenko have defined an entire network of areas within the brain dedicated to this ability, which work together when we speak, listen, read, write, or sign.

Much of the language network lies within the brain’s neocortex, where many of our most sophisticated cognitive functions are carried out. Now, Fedorenko’s lab, which is part of MIT’s Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, has identified language-processing regions within the cerebellum, extending the language network to a part of the brain better known for helping to coordinate the body’s movements. Their findings are reported January 21, 2026, in the journal Neuron.

“It’s like there’s this region in the cerebellum that we’ve been forgetting about for a long time,” says Colton Casto, a graduate student at Harvard and MIT who works in Fedorenko’s lab. “If you’re a language researcher, you should be paying attention to the cerebellum.”

Imaging the language network

There have been hints that the cerebellum makes important contributions to language. Some functional imaging studies detected activity in this area during language use, and people who suffer damage to the cerebellum sometimes experience language impairments. But no one had been able to pin down exactly which parts of the cerebellum were involved or tease out their roles in language processing.

To get some answers, Fedorenko’s lab took a systematic approach, using methods they have used to map the language network in the neocortex. For 15 years, the lab has captured functional brain imaging data as volunteers carried out various tasks inside an MRI scanner. By monitoring brain activity as people engaged in different kinds of language tasks, like reading sentences or listening to spoken words, as well as non-linguistic tasks, like listening to noise or memorizing spatial patterns, the team has been able identify parts of the brain that are exclusively dedicated to language processing.

Their work shows that everyone’s language network uses the same neocortical regions. The precise anatomical location of these regions varies, however, so to study the language network in any individual, Fedorenko and her team must map that person’s network inside an MRI scanner using their language-localizer tasks.

Satellite language network

While the Fedorenko lab has largely focused on how the neocortex contributes to language processing, their brain scans also capture activity in the cerebellum. So Casto revisited those scans, analyzing cerebellar activity from more than 800 people to look for regions involved in language processing. Fedorenko points out that teasing out the individual anatomy of the language network turned out to particularly vital in the cerebellum, where neurons are densely packed and areas with different functional specializations sit very close to one another. Ultimately, Casto was able to identify four cerebellar areas that consistently got involved during language use.

The cerebellum, highlighted in red. Image: Anatomography maintained by Life Science Databases(LSDB).

Three of these regions were clearly involved in language use, but also reliably became engaged during certain kinds of non-linguistic tasks. Casto says this was a surprise, because all the core language areas in the neocortex are dedicated exclusively to language processing. The researchers speculate that the cerebellum may be integrating information from different parts of the cortex—a function that could be important for many cognitive tasks.

“We’ve found that language is distinct from many, many other things—but at some point, complex cognition requires everything to work together,” Fedorenko says. “How do these different kinds of information get connected? Maybe parts of the cerebellum serve that function.”

The researchers also found a spot in the right posterior cerebellum with activity patterns that more closely echoed those of the language network in the neocortex. This region stayed silent during non-linguistic tasks, but became active during language use. For all of the linguistic activities that Casto analyzed, this region exhibited patterns of activity that were very similar to what the lab has seen in neocortical components of the language network. “Its contribution to language seems pretty similar,” Casto says. The team describes this area as a “cerebellar satellite” of the language network.

Still, the researchers think it’s unlikely that neurons in the cerebellum, which are organized very differently than those in the neocortex, replicate the precise function of other parts of the language network. Fedorenko’s team plans to explore the function of this satellite region more deeply, investigating whether it may participate in different kinds of tasks.

The researchers are also exploring the possibility that the cerebellum is particularly important for language learning—playing an outsized role during development or when people learn languages later in life.

Fedorenko says the discovery may also have implications for treating language impairments caused when an injury or disease damages the brain’s neocortical language network. “This area may provide a very interesting potential target to help recovery from aphasia,” Fedorenko says. Currently, researchers are exploring the possibility that non-invasively stimulating language-associated parts of the brain might promote language recovery. “This right cerebellar region may be just the right thing to potentially stimulate to up-regulate some of that function that’s lost,” Fedorenko says.

When it comes to language, context matters

Anne Trafton |

In everyday conversation, it’s critical to understand not just the words that are spoken, but the context in which they are said. If it’s pouring rain and someone remarks on the “lovely weather,” you won’t understand their meaning unless you realize that they’re being sarcastic.

Making inferences about what someone really means when it doesn’t match the literal meaning of their words is a skill known as pragmatic language ability. This includes not only interpreting sarcasm but also understanding metaphors and white lies, among many other conversational subtleties.

Portrait of McGovern Investigator Evelina Fedorenko in a black shirt with soft white lights in background. Photo: Alexandra Sokhina
McGovern Investigator Evelina Fedorenko. Photo: Alexandra Sokhina

“Pragmatics is trying to reason about why somebody might say something, and what is the message they’re trying to convey given that they put it in this particular way,” says Evelina Fedorenko, an MIT associate professor of brain and cognitive sciences and a member of MIT’s McGovern Institute for Brain Research.

New research from Fedorenko and her colleagues has revealed that these abilities can be grouped together based on what types of inferences they require. In a study of 800 people, the researchers identified three clusters of pragmatic skills that are based on the same kinds of inferences and may have similar underlying neural processes.

One of these clusters includes inferences that are based on our knowledge of social conventions and rules. Another depends on knowledge of how the physical world works, while the last requires the ability to interpret differences in tone, which can indicate emphasis or emotion.

Fedorenko and Edward Gibson, an MIT professor of brain and cognitive sciences, are the senior authors of the study, which appears today in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The paper’s lead authors are Sammy Floyd, a former MIT postdoc who is now an assistant professor of psychology at Sarah Lawrence College, and Olessia Jouravlev, a former MIT postdoc who is now an associate professor of cognitive science at Carleton University.

The importance of context

Much past research on how people understand language has focused on processing the literal meanings of words and how they fit together. To really understand what someone is saying, however, we need to interpret those meanings based on context.

“Language is about getting meanings across, and that often requires taking into account many different kinds of information — such as the social context, the visual context, or the present topic of the conversation,” Fedorenko says.

As one example, the phrase “people are leaving” can mean different things depending on the context, Gibson points out. If it’s late at night and someone asks you how a party is going, you may say “people are leaving,” to convey that the party is ending and everyone’s going home.

“However, if it’s early, and I say ‘people are leaving,’ then the implication is that the party isn’t very good,” Gibson says. “When you say a sentence, there’s a literal meaning to it, but how you interpret that literal meaning depends on the context.”

About 10 years ago, with support from the Simons Center for the Social Brain at MIT, Fedorenko and Gibson decided to explore whether it might be possible to precisely distinguish the types of processing that go into pragmatic language skills.

One way that neuroscientists can approach a question like this is to use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to scan the brains of participants as they perform different tasks. This allows them to link brain activity in different locations to different functions. However, the tasks that the researchers designed for this study didn’t easily lend themselves to being performed in a scanner, so they took an alternative approach.

This approach, known as “individual differences,” involves studying a large number of people as they perform a variety of tasks. This technique allows researchers to determine whether the same underlying brain processes may be responsible for performance on different tasks.

To do this, the researchers evaluate whether each participant tends to perform similarly on certain groups of tasks. For example, some people might perform well on tasks that require an understanding of social conventions, such as interpreting indirect requests and irony. The same people might do only so-so on tasks that require understanding how the physical world works, and poorly on tasks that require distinguishing meanings based on changes in intonation — the melody of speech. This would suggest that separate brain processes are being recruited for each set of tasks.

The first phase of the study was led by Jouravlev, who assembled existing tasks that require pragmatic skills and created many more, for a total of 20. These included tasks that require people to understand humor and sarcasm, as well as tasks where changes in intonation can affect the meaning of a sentence. For example, someone who says “I wanted blue and black socks,” with emphasis on the word “black,” is implying that the black socks were forgotten.

“People really find ways to communicate creatively and indirectly and non-literally, and this battery of tasks captures that,” Floyd says.

Components of pragmatic ability

The researchers recruited study participants from an online crowdsourcing platform to perform the tasks, which took about eight hours to complete. From this first set of 400 participants, the researchers found that the tasks formed three clusters, related to social context, general knowledge of the world, and intonation. To test the robustness of the findings, the researchers continued the study with another set of 400 participants, with this second half run by Floyd after Jouravlev had left MIT.

With the second set of participants, the researchers found that tasks clustered into the same three groups. They also confirmed that differences in general intelligence, or in auditory processing ability (which is important for the processing of intonation), did not affect the outcomes that they observed.

In future work, the researchers hope to use brain imaging to explore whether the pragmatic components they identified are correlated with activity in different brain regions. Previous work has found that brain imaging often mirrors the distinctions identified in individual difference studies, but can also help link the relevant abilities to specific neural systems, such as the core language system or the theory of mind system.

This set of tests could also be used to study people with autism, who sometimes have difficulty understanding certain social cues. Such studies could determine more precisely the nature and extent of these difficulties. Another possibility could be studying people who were raised in different cultures, which may have different norms around speaking directly or indirectly.

“In Russian, which happens to be my native language, people are more direct. So perhaps there might be some differences in how native speakers of Russian process indirect requests compared to speakers of English,” Jouravlev says.

The research was funded by the Simons Center for the Social Brain at MIT, the National Institutes of Health, and the National Science Foundation.

The cost of thinking

by Jennifer Michalowski |

Large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT can write an essay or plan a menu almost instantly. But until recently, it was also easy to stump them. The models, which rely on language patterns to respond to users’ queries, often failed at math problems and were not good at complex reasoning. Suddenly, however, they’ve gotten a lot better at these things.

A new generation of LLMs known as reasoning models are being trained to solve complex problems. Like humans, they need some time to think through problems like these—and remarkably, scientists at MIT’s McGovern Institute have found that the kinds of problems that require the most processing from reasoning models are the very same problems that people need take their time with. In other words, they report in the November 18 issue of the journal PNAS, the “cost of thinking” for a reasoning model is similar to the cost of thinking for a human.

The researchers, who were led by McGovern Institute Investigator Evelina Fedorenko, conclude that in at least one important way, reasoning models have a human-like approach to thinking. That, they note, is not by design. “People who build these models don’t care if they do it like humans. They just want a system that will robustly perform under all sorts of conditions and produce correct responses,” Fedorenko says.

“The fact that there’s some convergence is really quite striking.” — Evelina Fedorenko

Reasoning models

Like many forms of artificial intelligence, the new reasoning models are artificial neural networks: computational tools that learn how to process information when they are given data and a problem to solve. Artificial neural networks have been very successful at many of the tasks that the brain’s own neural networks do well—and in some cases, neuroscientists have discovered that those that perform best do share certain aspects of information processing in the brain. Still, some scientists argued that artificial intelligence was not ready to take on more sophisticated aspects of human intelligence.

“Up until recently, I was among the people saying, ‘these models are really good at things like perception and language, but it’s still going to be a long ways off until we have neural network models that can do reasoning,” says Fedorenko, who is also an associate professor of brain and cognitive sciences at MIT. “Then these large reasoning models emerged and they seem to do much better at a lot of these thinking tasks, like solving math problems and writing pieces of computer code.”

Computational neuroscientist Andrea Gregor de Varda is a K. Lisa Yang ICoN Center Fellow and a postdoctoral researcher in Evelina Fedorenko’s lab. Photo: Steph Stevens

Andrea Gregor de Varda, a K. Lisa Yang ICoN Center Fellow and a postdoctoral researcher in Fedorenko’s lab, explains that reasoning models work out problems step by step. “At some point, people realized that models needed to have more space to perform the actual computations that are needed to solve complex problems,” he says. “The performance started becoming way, way stronger if you let the models break down the problems into parts.”

To encourage models to work through complex problems in steps that lead to correct solutions, engineers can use reinforcement learning. During their training, the models are rewarded for correct answers and penalized for wrong ones. “The models explore the problem space themselves,” de Varda says. “The actions that lead to positive rewards are reinforced, so that they produce correct solutions more often.”

Models trained in this way are much more likely than their predecessors to arrive at the same answers a human would when they are given a reasoning task. Their stepwise problem solving does mean reasoning models can take a bit longer to find an answer than the LLMs that came before—but since they’re getting right answers where the previous models would have failed, their responses are worth the wait.

The models’ need to take some time to work through complex problems already hints at a parallel to human thinking: if you demand that a person solve a hard problem instantaneously, they’d probably fail too. De Varda wanted to examine this relationship more systematically. So he gave reasoning models and human volunteers the same set of problems, and tracked not just whether they got the answers right, but also how much time or effort it took them to get there.

Time vs. tokens

This meant measuring how long it took people to respond to each question, down to the millisecond. For the models, Varda used a different metric. It didn’t make sense to measure processing time, since this is more dependent on computer hardware than the effort the model puts into solving a problem. So instead, he tracked tokens, which are part of a model’s internal chain of thought. “They produce tokens that are not meant for the user to see and work on, but just to have some track of the internal computation that they’re doing,” de Varda explains.

“It’s as if they were talking to themselves.” — Andrea Gregor de Varda

Both humans and reasoning models were asked to solve seven different types of problems, like numeric arithmetic and intuitive reasoning. For each problem class, they were given many problems. The harder a given problem was, the longer it took people to solve it—and the longer it took people to solve a problem, the more tokens a reasoning model generated as it came to its own solution.

Likewise, the classes of problems that humans took longest to solve were the same classes of problems that required the most tokens for the models: arithmetic problems were the least demanding, whereas a group of problems called the “ARC challenge,” where pairs of colored grids represent a transformation that must be inferred and then applied to a new object, were the most costly for both people and models.

De Varda and Fedorenko say the striking match in the costs of thinking demonstrates one way in which reasoning models are thinking like humans. That doesn’t mean the models are recreating human intelligence, though. The researchers still want to know whether the models use similar representations of information to the human brain, and how those representations are transformed into solutions to problems. They’re also curious whether the models will be able to handle problems that require world knowledge that is not spelled out in the texts that are used for model training.

The researchers point out that even though reasoning models generate internal monologues as they solve problems, they are not necessarily using language to think. “If you look at the output that these models produce while reasoning, it often contains errors or some nonsensical bits, even if the model ultimately arrives at a correct answer. So the actual internal computations likely take place in an abstract, non-linguistic representation space, similar to how humans don’t use language to think,” he says.

MIT cognitive scientists reveal why some sentences stand out from others

by Anne Trafton |

Press Mentions

Why do some sentences stay in your head...

Brighter Side of News

“You still had to prove yourself.”

“Every cloud has a blue lining!”

Which of those sentences are you most likely to remember a few minutes from now? If you guessed the second, you’re probably correct.

According to a new study from MIT cognitive scientists, sentences that stick in your mind longer are those that have distinctive meanings, making them stand out from sentences you’ve previously seen. They found that meaning, not any other trait, is the most important feature when it comes to memorability.

Greta Tuckute, a former graduate student in the Fedorenko lab. Photo: Caitlin Cunningham

“One might have thought that when you remember sentences, maybe it’s all about the visual features of the sentence, but we found that that was not the case. A big contribution of this paper is pinning down that it is the meaning-related space that makes sentences memorable,” says Greta Tuckute PhD ’25, who is now a research fellow at Harvard University’s Kempner Institute.

The findings support the hypothesis that sentences with distinctive meanings — like “Does olive oil work for tanning?” — are stored in brain space that is not cluttered with sentences that mean almost the same thing. Sentences with similar meanings end up densely packed together and are therefore more difficult to recognize confidently later on, the researchers believe.

“When you encode sentences that have a similar meaning, there’s feature overlap in that space. Therefore, a particular sentence you’ve encoded is not linked to a unique set of features, but rather to a whole bunch of features that may overlap with other sentences,” says Evelina Fedorenko, an MIT associate professor of brain and cognitive sciences (BCS), a member of MIT’s McGovern Institute for Brain Research, and the senior author of the study.

Tuckute and Thomas Clark, an MIT graduate student, are the lead authors of the paper, which appears in the Journal of Memory and Language. MIT graduate student Bryan Medina is also an author.

Distinctive sentences

What makes certain things more memorable than others is a longstanding question in cognitive science and neuroscience. In a 2011 study, Aude Oliva, now a senior research scientist at MIT and MIT director of the MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab, showed that not all items are created equal: Some types of images are much easier to remember than others, and people are remarkably consistent in what images they remember best.

In that study, Oliva and her colleagues found that, in general, images with people in them are the most memorable, followed by images of human-scale space and close-ups of objects. Least memorable are natural landscapes.

As a follow-up to that study, Fedorenko and Oliva, along with Ted Gibson, another faculty member in BCS, teamed up to determine if words also vary in their memorability. In a study published earlier this year, co-led by Tuckute and Kyle Mahowald, a former PhD student in BCS, the researchers found that the most memorable words are those that have the most distinctive meanings.

Words are categorized as being more distinctive if they have a single meaning, and few or no synonyms — for example, words like “pineapple” or “avalanche” which were found to be very memorable. On the other hand, words that can have multiple meanings, such as “light,” or words that have many synonyms, like “happy,” were more difficult for people to recognize accurately.

In the new study, the researchers expanded their scope to analyze the memorability of sentences. Just like words, some sentences have very distinctive meanings, while others communicate similar information in slightly different ways.

To do the study, the researchers assembled a collection of 2,500 sentences drawn from publicly available databases that compile text from novels, news articles, movie dialogues, and other sources. Each sentence that they chose contained exactly six words.

The researchers then presented a random selection of about 1,000 of these sentences to each study participant, including repeats of some sentences. Each of the 500 participants in the study was asked to press a button when they saw a sentence that they remembered seeing earlier.

The most memorable sentences — the ones where participants accurately and quickly indicated that they had seen them before — included strings such as “Homer Simpson is hungry, very hungry,” and “These mosquitoes are — well, guinea pigs.”

Those memorable sentences overlapped significantly with sentences that were determined as having distinctive meanings as estimated through the high-dimensional vector space of a large language model (LLM) known as Sentence BERT. That model is able to generate sentence-level representations of sentences, which can be used for tasks like judging meaning similarity between sentences. This model provided researchers with a distinctness score for each sentence based on its semantic similarity to other sentences.

The researchers also evaluated the sentences using a model that predicts memorability based on the average memorability of the individual words in the sentence. This model performed fairly well at predicting overall sentence memorability, but not as well as Sentence BERT. This suggests that the meaning of a sentence as a whole — above and beyond the contributions from individual words — determines how memorable it will be, the researchers say.

Noisy memories

While cognitive scientists have long hypothesized that the brain’s memory banks have a limited capacity, the findings of the new study support an alternative hypothesis that would help to explain how the brain can continue forming new memories without losing old ones.

This alternative, known as the noisy representation hypothesis, says that when the brain encodes a new memory, be it an image, a word, or a sentence, it is represented in a noisy way — that is, this representation is not identical to the stimulus, and some information is lost. For example, for an image, you may not encode the exact viewing angle at which an object is shown, and for a sentence, you may not remember the exact construction used.

Under this theory, a new sentence would be encoded in a similar part of the memory space as sentences that carry a similar meanings, whether they were encountered recently or sometime across a lifetime of language experience. This jumbling of similar meanings together increases the amount of noise and can make it much harder, later on, to remember the exact sentence you have seen before.

“The representation is gradually going to accumulate some noise. As a result, when you see an image or a sentence for a second time, your accuracy at judging whether you’ve seen it before will be affected, and it’ll be less than 100 percent in most cases,” Clark says.

However, if a sentence has a unique meaning that is encoded in a less densely crowded space, it will be easier to pick out later on.

“Your memory may still be noisy, but your ability to make judgments based on the representations is less affected by that noise because the representation is so distinctive to begin with,” Clark says.

The researchers now plan to study whether other features of sentences, such as more vivid and descriptive language, might also contribute to making them more memorable, and how the language system may interact with the hippocampal memory structures during the encoding and retrieval of memories.

The research was funded, in part, by the National Institutes of Health, the McGovern Institute, the Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, the Simons Center for the Social Brain, and the MIT Quest Initiative for Intelligence.

New gift expands mental illness studies at Poitras Center for Psychiatric Disorders Research

by Julie Pryor |

One in every eight people—970 million globally—live with mental illness, according to the World Health Organization, with depression and anxiety being the most common mental health conditions worldwide. Existing therapies for complex psychiatric disorders like depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia have limitations, and federal funding to address these shortcomings is growing increasingly uncertain.

Jim and Pat Poitras
James and Patricia Poitras at an event co-hosted by the McGovern Institute and Autism Speaks. Photo: Justin Knight

Patricia and James Poitras ’63 have committed $8 million to the Poitras Center for Psychiatric Disorders Research to launch pioneering research initiatives aimed at uncovering the brain basis of major mental illness and accelerating the development of novel treatments.

“Federal funding rarely supports the kind of bold, early-stage research that has the potential to transform our understanding of psychiatric illness. Pat and I want to help fill that gap—giving researchers the freedom to follow their most promising leads, even when the path forward isn’t guaranteed,” says James Poitras, who is chair of the McGovern Institute Board.

Their latest gift builds upon their legacy of philanthropic support for psychiatric disorders research at MIT, which now exceeds $46 million.

“With deep gratitude for Jim and Pat’s visionary support, we are eager to launch a bold set of studies aimed at unraveling the neural and cognitive underpinnings of major mental illnesses,” says Robert Desimone, director of the McGovern Institute, home to the Poitras Center. “Together, these projects represent a powerful step toward transforming how we understand and treat mental illness.”

A legacy of support

Soon after joining the McGovern Institute Leadership Board in 2006, the Poitrases made a $20 million commitment to establish the Poitras Center for Psychiatric Disorders Research at MIT. The center’s goal, to improve human health by addressing the root causes of complex psychiatric disorders, is deeply personal to them both.

“We had decided many years ago that our philanthropic efforts would be directed towards psychiatric research. We could not have imagined then that this perfect synergy between research at MIT’s McGovern Institute and our own philanthropic goals would develop,” recalls Patricia.

The center supports research at the McGovern Institute and collaborative projects with institutions such as the Broad Institute, McLean Hospital, Mass General Brigham and other clinical research centers. Since its establishment in 2007, the center has enabled advances in psychiatric research including the development of a machine learning “risk calculator” for bipolar disorder, the use of brain imaging to predict treatment outcomes for anxiety, and studies demonstrating that mindfulness can improve mental health in adolescents.

A scientist speaks at a podium with an image of DNA on the wall behind him.
Feng Zhang, the James and Patricia Poitras Professor of Neuroscience at MIT, delivers a lecture at the Poitras Center’s 10th anniversary celebration in 2017. Photo: Justin Knight

For the past decade, the Poitrases have also fueled breakthroughs in McGovern Investigator Feng Zhang’s lab, backing the invention of powerful CRISPR systems and other molecular tools that are transforming biology and medicine. Their support has enabled the Zhang team to engineer new delivery vehicles for gene therapy, including vehicles capable of carrying genetic payloads that were once out of reach. The lab has also advanced innovative RNA-guided gene engineering tools such as NovaIscB, published in Nature Biotechnology in May 2025. These revolutionary genome editing and delivery technologies hold promise for the next generation of therapies needed for serious psychiatric illness.

In addition to fueling research in the center, the Poitras family has gifted two endowed professorships—the James and Patricia Poitras Professor of Neuroscience at MIT, currently held by Feng Zhang, and the James W. (1963) and Patricia T. Poitras Professor of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, held by Guoping Feng—and an annual postdoctoral fellowship at the McGovern Institute.

New initiatives at the Poitras Center

The Poitras family’s latest commitment to the Poitras Center will launch an ambitious set of new projects that bring together neuroscientists, clinicians, and computational experts to probe underpinnings of complex psychiatric disorders including schizophrenia, anxiety, and depression. These efforts reflect the center’s core mission: to speed scientific discovery and therapeutic innovation in the field of psychiatric brain disorders research.

McGovern cognitive neuroscientists Evelina Fedorenko PhD ‘07 and Nancy Kanwisher ’80, PhD ’86, the Walter A. Rosenblith Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience—in collaboration with psychiatrist Ann Shinn of McLean Hospital—will explore how altered inner speech and reasoning contribute to the symptoms of schizophrenia. They will collect functional MRI data from individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia and matched controls as they perform reasoning tasks. The goal is to identify the brain activity patterns that underlie impaired reasoning in schizophrenia, a core cognitive disruption in the disorder.

Three women wearing name tags smile for hte camera.
Patricia Poitras (center) with McGovern Investigators Nancy Kanwisher ’80, PhD ’86 (left) and Martha Constantine-Paton (right) at the Poitras Center’s 10th anniversary celebration in 2017. Photo: Justin Knight

A complementary line of investigation will focus on the role of inner speech—the “voice in our head” that shapes thought and self-awareness. The team will conduct a large-scale online behavioral study of neurotypical individuals to analyze how inner speech characteristics correlate with schizophrenia-spectrum traits. This will be followed by neuroimaging work comparing brain architecture among individuals with strong or weak inner voices and people with schizophrenia, with the aim of discovering neural markers linked to self-talk and disrupted cognition.

A different project led by McGovern neuroscientist Mark Harnett and 2024–2026 Poitras Center Postdoctoral Fellow Cynthia Rais focuses on how ketamine—an increasingly used antidepressant—alters brain circuits to produce rapid and sustained improvements in mood. Despite its clinical success, ketamine’s mechanisms of action remain poorly understood. The Harnett lab is using sophisticated tools to track how ketamine affects synaptic communication and large-scale brain network dynamics, particularly in models of treatment-resistant depression. By mapping these changes at both the cellular and systems levels, the team hopes to reveal how ketamine lifts mood so quickly—and inform the development of safer, longer-lasting antidepressants.

Guoping Feng is leveraging a new animal model of depression to uncover the brain circuits that drive major depressive disorder. The new animal model provides a powerful system for studying the intricacies of mood regulation. Feng’s team is using state-of-the-art molecular tools to identify the specific genes and cell types involved in this circuit, with the goal of developing targeted treatments that can fine-tune these emotional pathways.

“This is one of the most promising models we have for understanding depression at a mechanistic level,” says Feng, who is also associate director of the McGovern Institute. “It gives us a clear target for future therapies.”

Another novel approach to treating mood disorders comes from the lab of James DiCarlo, the Peter de Florez Professor of Neuroscience at MIT, who is exploring the brain’s visual-emotional interface as a therapeutic tool for anxiety. The amygdala, a key emotional center in the brain, is heavily influenced by visual input. DiCarlo’s lab is using advanced computational models to design visual scenes that may subtly shift emotional processing in the brain—essentially using sight to regulate mood. Unlike traditional therapies, this strategy could offer a noninvasive, drug-free option for individuals suffering from anxiety.

Together, these projects exemplify the kind of interdisciplinary, high-impact research that the Poitras Center was established to support.

“Mental illness affects not just individuals, but entire families who often struggle in silence and uncertainty,” adds Patricia. “Our hope is that Poitras Center scientists will continue to make important advancements and spark novel treatments for complex mental health disorders and most of all, give families living with these conditions a renewed sense of hope for the future.”

To the brain, Esperanto and Klingon appear the same as English or Mandarin

by Anne Trafton |

Within the human brain, a network of regions has evolved to process language. These regions are consistently activated whenever people listen to their native language or any language in which they are proficient.

A new study by MIT researchers finds that this network also responds to languages that are completely invented, such as Esperanto, which was created in the late 1800s as a way to promote international communication, and even to languages made up for television shows such as “Star Trek” and “Game of Thrones.”

To study how the brain responds to these artificial languages, MIT neuroscientists convened nearly 50 speakers of these languages over a single weekend. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the researchers found that when participants listened to a constructed language in which they were proficient, the same brain regions lit up as those activated when they processed their native language.

“We find that constructed languages very much recruit the same system as natural languages, which suggests that the key feature that is necessary to engage the system may have to do with the kinds of meanings that both kinds of languages can express,” says Evelina Fedorenko, an associate professor of neuroscience at MIT, a member of MIT’s McGovern Institute for Brain Research and the senior author of the study.

The findings help to define some of the key properties of language, the researchers say, and suggest that it’s not necessary for languages to have naturally evolved over a long period of time or to have a large number of speakers.

“It helps us narrow down this question of what a language is, and do it empirically, by testing how our brain responds to stimuli that might or might not be language-like,” says Saima Malik-Moraleda, an MIT postdoc and the lead author of the paper, which appears this week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

Convening the conlang community

Unlike natural languages, which evolve within communities and are shaped over time, constructed languages, or “conlangs,” are typically created by one person who decides what sounds will be used, how to label different concepts, and what the grammatical rules are.

Esperanto, the most widely spoken conlang, was created in 1887 by L.L. Zamenhof, who intended it to be used as a universal language for international communication. Currently, it is estimated that around 60,000 people worldwide are proficient in Esperanto.

In previous work, Fedorenko and her students have found that computer programming languages, such as Python — another type of invented language — do not activate the brain network that is used to process natural language. Instead, people who read computer code rely on the so-called multiple demand network, a brain system that is often recruited for difficult cognitive tasks.

Fedorenko and others have also investigated how the brain responds to other stimuli that share features with language, including music and nonverbal communication such as gestures and facial expressions.

“We spent a lot of time looking at all these various kinds of stimuli, finding again and again that none of them engage the language-processing mechanisms,” Fedorenko says. “So then the question becomes, what is it that natural languages have that none of those other systems do?”

That led the researchers to wonder if artificial languages like Esperanto would be processed more like programming languages or more like natural languages. Similar to programming languages, constructed languages are created by an individual for a specific purpose, without natural evolution within a community. However, unlike programming languages, both conlangs and natural languages can be used to convey meanings about the state of the external world or the speaker’s internal state.

To explore how the brain processes conlangs, the researchers invited speakers of Esperanto and several other constructed languages to MIT for a weekend conference in November 2022. The other languages included Klingon (from “Star Trek”), Na’vi (from “Avatar”), and two languages from “Game of Thrones” (High Valyrian and Dothraki). For all of these languages, there are texts available for people who want to learn the language, and for Esperanto, Klingon, and High Valyrian, there is even a Duolingo app available.

“It was a really fun event where all the communities came to participate, and over a weekend, we collected all the data,” says Malik-Moraleda, who co-led the data collection effort with former MIT postbac Maya Taliaferro, now a PhD student at New York University.

During that event, which also featured talks from several of the conlang creators, the researchers used fMRI to scan 44 conlang speakers as they listened to sentences from the constructed language in which they were proficient. The creators of these languages — who are co-authors on the paper — helped construct the sentences that were presented to the participants.

While in the scanner, the participants also either listened to or read sentences in their native language, and performed some nonlinguistic tasks for comparison. The researchers found that when people listened to a conlang, the same language regions in the brain were activated as when they listened to their native language.

Common features

The findings help to identify some of the key features that are necessary to recruit the brain’s language processing areas, the researchers say. One of the main characteristics driving language responses seems to be the ability to convey meanings about the interior and exterior world — a trait that is shared by natural and constructed languages, but not programming languages.

“All of the languages, both natural and constructed, express meanings related to inner and outer worlds. They refer to objects in the world, to properties of objects, to events,” Fedorenko says. “Whereas programming languages are much more similar to math. A programming language is a symbolic generative system that allows you to express complex meanings, but it’s a self-contained system: The meanings are highly abstract and mostly relational, and not connected to the real world that we experience.”

Some other characteristics of natural languages, which are not shared by constructed languages, don’t seem to be necessary to generate a response in the language network.

“It doesn’t matter whether the language is created and shaped over time by a community of speakers, because these constructed languages are not,” Malik-Moraleda says. “It doesn’t matter how old they are, because conlangs that are just a decade old engage the same brain regions as natural languages that have been around for many hundreds of years.”

To further refine the features of language that activate the brain’s language network, Fedorenko’s lab is now planning to study how the brain responds to a conlang called Lojban, which was created by the Logical Language Group in the 1990s and was designed to prevent ambiguity of meanings and promote more efficient communication.

The research was funded by MIT’s McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Brain and Cognitive Sciences Department, the Simons Center for the Social Brain, the Frederick A. and Carole J. Middleton Career Development Professorship, and the U.S. National Institutes of Health.

Evelina Fedorenko receives Troland Award from National Academy of Sciences

by Julie Pryor |

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) announced today that McGovern Investigator Evelina Fedorenko will receive a 2025 Troland Research Award for her groundbreaking contributions towards understanding the language network in the human brain.

The Troland Research Award is given annually to recognize unusual achievement by early-career researchers within the broad spectrum of experimental psychology.

Two women and one child looking at a computer screen.
McGovern Investigator Ev Fedorenko (center) looks at a young subject’s brain scan in the Martinos Imaging Center at MIT. Photo: Alexandra Sokhina

Fedorenko, who is an associate professor of brain and cognitive sciences at MIT, is interested in how minds and brains create language. Her lab is unpacking the internal architecture of the brain’s language system and exploring the relationship between language and various cognitive, perceptual, and motor systems.  Her novel methods combine precise measures of an individual’s brain organization with innovative computational modeling to make fundamental discoveries about the computations that underlie the uniquely human ability for language.

Fedorenko has shown that the language network is selective for language processing over diverse non-linguistic processes that have been argued to share computational demands with language, such as math, music, and social reasoning. Her work has also demonstrated that syntactic processing is not localized to a particular region within the language network, and every brain region that responds to syntactic processing is at least as sensitive to word meanings.

She has also shown that representations from neural network language models, such as ChatGPT, are similar to those in the human language brain areas. Fedorenko also highlighted that although language models can master linguistic rules and patterns, they are less effective at using language in real-world situations. In the human brain, that kind of functional competence is distinct from formal language competence, she says, requiring not just language-processing circuits but also brain areas that store knowledge of the world, reason, and interpret social interactions. Contrary to a prominent view that language is essential for thinking, Fedorenko argues that language is not the medium of thought and is primarily a tool for communication.

A probabilistic atlas of the human language network based on >800 individuals (center) and sample individual language networks, which illustrate inter-individual variability in the precise locations and shapes of the language areas. Image: Ev Fedorenko

Ultimately, Fedorenko’s cutting-edge work is uncovering the computations and representations that fuel language processing in the brain. She will receive the Troland Award this April, during the annual meeting of the NAS in Washington DC.

 

 

 

Scientists find neurons that process language on different timescales

by Anne Trafton |

Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), neuroscientists have identified several regions of the brain that are responsible for processing language. However, discovering the specific functions of neurons in those regions has proven difficult because fMRI, which measures changes in blood flow, doesn’t have high enough resolution to reveal what small populations of neurons are doing.

Now, using a more precise technique that involves recording electrical activity directly from the brain, MIT neuroscientists have identified different clusters of neurons that appear to process different amounts of linguistic context. These “temporal windows” range from just one word up to about six words.

The temporal windows may reflect different functions for each population, the researchers say. Populations with shorter windows may analyze the meanings of individual words, while those with longer windows may interpret more complex meanings created when words are strung together.

“This is the first time we see clear heterogeneity within the language network,” says Evelina Fedorenko, an associate professor of neuroscience at MIT. “Across dozens of fMRI experiments, these brain areas all seem to do the same thing, but it’s a large, distributed network, so there’s got to be some structure there. This is the first clear demonstration that there is structure, but the different neural populations are spatially interleaved so we can’t see these distinctions with fMRI.”

Fedorenko, who is also a member of MIT’s McGovern Institute for Brain Research, is the senior author of the study, which appears today in Nature Human Behavior. MIT postdoc Tamar Regev and Harvard University graduate student Colton Casto are the lead authors of the paper.

Temporal windows

Functional MRI, which has helped scientists learn a great deal about the roles of different parts of the brain, works by measuring changes in blood flow in the brain. These measurements act as a proxy of neural activity during a particular task. However, each “voxel,” or three-dimensional chunk, of an fMRI image represents hundreds of thousands to millions of neurons and sums up activity across about two seconds, so it can’t reveal fine-grained detail about what those neurons are doing.

One way to get more detailed information about neural function is to record electrical activity using electrodes implanted in the brain. These data are hard to come by because this procedure is done only in patients who are already undergoing surgery for a neurological condition such as severe epilepsy.

“It can take a few years to get enough data for a task because these patients are relatively rare, and in a given patient electrodes are implanted in idiosyncratic locations based on clinical needs, so it takes a while to assemble a dataset with sufficient coverage of some target part of the cortex. But these data, of course, are the best kind of data we can get from human brains: You know exactly where you are spatially and you have very fine-grained temporal information,” Fedorenko says.

In a 2016 study, Fedorenko reported using this approach to study the language processing regions of six people. Electrical activity was recorded while the participants read four different types of language stimuli: complete sentences, lists of words, lists of non-words, and “jabberwocky” sentences — sentences that have grammatical structure but are made of nonsense words.

Those data showed that in some neural populations in language processing regions, activity would gradually build up over a period of several words, when the participants were reading sentences. However, this did not happen when they read lists of words, lists of nonwords, of Jabberwocky sentences.

In the new study, Regev and Casto went back to those data and analyzed the temporal response profiles in greater detail. In their original dataset, they had recordings of electrical activity from 177 language-responsive electrodes across the six patients. Conservative estimates suggest that each electrode represents an average of activity from about 200,000 neurons. They also obtained new data from a second set of 16 patients, which included recordings from another 362 language-responsive electrodes.

When the researchers analyzed these data, they found that in some of the neural populations, activity would fluctuate up and down with each word. In others, however, activity would build up over multiple words before falling again, and yet others would show a steady buildup of neural activity over longer spans of words.

By comparing their data with predictions made by a computational model that the researchers designed to process stimuli with different temporal windows, the researchers found that neural populations from language processing areas could be divided into three clusters. These clusters represent temporal windows of either one, four, or six words.

“It really looks like these neural populations integrate information across different timescales along the sentence,” Regev says.

Processing words and meaning

These differences in temporal window size would have been impossible to see using fMRI, the researchers say.

“At the resolution of fMRI, we don’t see much heterogeneity within language-responsive regions. If you localize in individual participants the voxels in their brain that are most responsive to language, you find that their responses to sentences, word lists, jabberwocky sentences and non-word lists are highly similar,” Casto says.

The researchers were also able to determine the anatomical locations where these clusters were found. Neural populations with the shortest temporal window were found predominantly in the posterior temporal lobe, though some were also found in the frontal or anterior temporal lobes. Neural populations from the two other clusters, with longer temporal windows, were spread more evenly throughout the temporal and frontal lobes.

Fedorenko’s lab now plans to study whether these timescales correspond to different functions. One possibility is that the shortest timescale populations may be processing the meanings of a single word, while those with longer timescales interpret the meanings represented by multiple words.

“We already know that in the language network, there is sensitivity to how words go together and to the meanings of individual words,” Regev says. “So that could potentially map to what we’re finding, where the longest timescale is sensitive to things like syntax or relationships between words, and maybe the shortest timescale is more sensitive to features of single words or parts of them.”

The research was funded by the Zuckerman-CHE STEM Leadership Program, the Poitras Center for Psychiatric Disorders Research, the Kempner Institute for the Study of Natural and Artificial Intelligence at Harvard University, the U.S. National Institutes of Health, an American Epilepsy Society Research and Training Fellowship, the McDonnell Center for Systems Neuroscience, Fondazione Neurone, the McGovern Institute, MIT’s Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, and the Simons Center for the Social Brain.

What is language for?

by Jennifer Michalowski |

Press Mentions

You don't need words to think

Scientific American

Language is a defining feature of humanity, and for centuries, philosophers and scientists have contemplated its true purpose. We use language to share information and exchange ideas—but is it more than that? Do we use language not just to communicate, but to think?

In the June 19, 2024, issue of the journal Nature, McGovern Institute neuroscientist Evelina Fedorenko and colleagues argue that we do not. Language, they say, is primarily a tool for communication.

Fedorenko acknowledges that there is an intuitive link between language and thought. Many people experience an inner voice that seems to narrate their own thoughts. And it’s not unreasonable to expect that well-spoken, articulate individuals are also clear thinkers. But as compelling as these associations can be, they are not evidence that we actually use language to think.

 “I think there are a few strands of intuition and confusions that have led people to believe very strongly that language is the medium of thought,” she says.

“But when they are pulled apart thread by thread, they don’t really hold up to empirical scrutiny.”

Separating language and thought

For centuries, language’s potential role in facilitating thinking was nearly impossible to evaluate scientifically.

McGovern Investivator Ev Fedorenko in the Martinos Imaging Center at MIT. Photo: Caitlin Cunningham

But neuroscientists and cognitive scientists now have tools that enable a more rigorous consideration of the idea. Evidence from both fields, which Fedorenko, MIT cognitive scientist and linguist Edward Gibson, and University of California Berkeley cognitive scientist Steven Piantadosi review in their Nature Perspective, supports the idea that language is a tool for communication, not for thought.

“What we’ve learned by using methods that actually tell us about the engagement of the linguistic processing mechanisms is that those mechanisms are not really engaged when we think,” Fedorenko says. Also, she adds, “you can take those mechanisms away, and it seems that thinking can go on just fine.”

Over the past 20 years, Fedorenko and other neuroscientists have advanced our understanding of what happens in the brain as it generates and understands language. Now, using functional MRI to find parts of the brain that are specifically engaged when someone reads or listens to sentences or passages, they can reliably identify an individual’s language-processing network. Then they can monitor those brain regions while the person performs other tasks, from solving a sudoku puzzle to reasoning about other people’s beliefs.

“Your language system is basically silent when you do all sorts of thinking.” – Ev Fedorenko

“Pretty much everything we’ve tested so far, we don’t see any evidence of the engagement of the language mechanisms,” Fedorenko says. “Your language system is basically silent when you do all sorts of thinking.”

That’s consistent with observations from people who have lost the ability to process language due to an injury or stroke. Severely affected patients can be completely unable to process words, yet this does not interfere with their ability to solve math problems, play chess, or plan for future events. “They can do all the things that they could do before their injury. They just can’t take those mental representations and convert them into a format which would allow them to talk about them with others,” Fedorenko says. “If language gives us the core representations that we use for reasoning, then…destroying the language system should lead to problems in thinking as well, and it really doesn’t.”

Conversely, intellectual impairments do not always associate with language impairment; people with intellectual disability disorders or neuropsychiatric disorders that limit their ability to think and reason do not necessarily have problems with basic linguistic functions. Just as language does not appear to be necessary for thought, Fedorenko and colleagues conclude that it is also not sufficient to produce clear thinking.

Language optimization

In addition to arguing that language is unlikely to be used for thinking, the scientists considered its suitability as a communication tool, drawing on findings from linguistic analyses. Analyses across dozens of diverse languages, both spoken and signed, have found recurring features that make them easy to produce and understand. “It turns out that pretty much any property you look at, you can find evidence that languages are optimized in a way that makes information transfer as efficient as possible,” Fedorenko says.

That’s not a new idea, but it has held up as linguists analyze larger corpora across more diverse sets of languages, which has become possible in recent years as the field has assembled corpora that are annotated for various linguistic features. Such studies find that across languages, sounds and words tend to be pieced together in ways that minimize effort for the language producer without muddling the message. For example, commonly used words tend to be short, while words whose meanings depend on one another tend to cluster close together in sentences. Likewise, linguists have noted features that help languages convey meaning despite potential “signal distortions,” whether due to attention lapses or ambient noise.

“All of these features seem to suggest that the forms of languages are optimized to make communication easier,” Fedorenko says, pointing out that such features would be irrelevant if language was primarily a tool for internal thought.

“Given that languages have all these properties, it’s likely that we use language for communication,” she says. She and her coauthors conclude that as a powerful tool for transmitting knowledge, language reflects the sophistication of human cognition—but does not give rise to it.